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ABSTRACT
Economic theory offers interpretations of intergenerational correlations that are different from the
theories of other disciplines, and have important policy implications.  Our paper presents a subset of those
theories, and shows how they are consistent with observed mobility patterns as they vary across countries,
demographic groups, and economic status measure.  The data may suggest that the economic approach
overemphasizes credit constraints, although more work is needed to further develop some of the
alternative economic models.  We also show how, in the models, "progressive" policy may reduce
mobility depending on how the policy is administered and how mobility is measured.
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c-mulligan@uchicago.eduMeasuring intergenerational correlations is as old as empirical social science itself (e.g., Galton￿s
1869 study of the eminence of relatives or his 1889 analysis of the heights of parents and children),
but extensive use of economic theory to interpret these correlations is much more recent. Using
simple economic concepts such as supply, demand, investment, incentives, missing markets, etc.,
theorists hope to explain how and why status is correlated across generations.  Economic theory
might provide a unified treatment of a variety of socioeconomic indicators ￿ such as earnings,
income, occupation, or wealth.  Or it might predict how taxes, subsidies, and economic regulation
affect intergenerational mobility and the operation of markets. 
However, while the subject matter ￿ earnings, consumption, wealth, occupation ￿ is clearly
interesting to economists, it could nonetheless be that, beyond basic questions of measurement,
economic theory has not improved our understanding of intergenerational mobility.  Goldberger
(1989) is quite explicit in this contention.  And by emphasizing the distinction between genes and
environment, and by using statistical theory as its main analytical tool, Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis￿ contribution to this volume implicitly concurs with Goldberger.  We take this challenge very
seriously.
What characterizes an economic approach to mobility?  While biologists (and Bowles and Gintis)
distinguish ￿endowments￿ and ￿investments￿ by their source (genetic vs. environmental factors), one
focus of economic theorists is motivation ￿ that is, sensitivity to prices.  Abilities that are
￿automatically￿ transmitted from parents to children without regard for incentives or deterrents are
endowments.  Notice that by this definition, endowments might include environmental factors if
some aspects of the environment are insensitive to prices.  By contrast, investments encompass those
skills that are determined in response to the economic environment.  
One reason economic theorists might prefer an incentive-based decomposition over a source-based
alternative is that without reference to incentives, it is impossible to study efficiency losses
associated with public policies like those proposed by Bowles and Gintis.  Since accurate prediction
ultimately determines the usefulness of theory, our paper gives the reader a taste of some predictions
derived from economic theory and some empirical successes and failures.  We provide only a taste,Economic Interpretations ￿ 2
1Just as the economic theory of intergenerational correlation conceptually aggregates more
detailed economic theories of behavior, there is an empirical literature studying the relation
between credit constraints, endowments, and more detailed behaviors.  Summarizing those
studies is beyond the scope of our paper (see Cameron and Heckman 1999 for one review), but
the results there may be consistent with those of the intergenerational correlation studies we cite.
because there are a great many economic models relevant to intergenerational correlations (such as
models of educational attainment, neighborhood effects in schooling, family formation and fertility
choice, occupational choice, discrimination, etc.), and quite a variety of predictions that might be
derived from even one of these models.  However, a simple model of investment and
intergenerational decision-making can be interpreted as a conceptual aggregation of many more
detailed economic models.  We present such a model and from it derive one class of predictions that
has received substantial attention in the empirical literature ￿ the role of endowments and credit
markets in determining intergenerational correlations.
1
A Theory of Family Investment and Intergenerational Mobility
Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) present a simple economic model which has been used and
extended to derive several important predictions.  Families can bequeath human capital and financial
assets and, for the moment, a family￿s financial asset holdings can be negative.   Families choose the
level of human capital investment in their children by comparing the returns for the two investments.
Assuming that the return to human investment is initially very large, the first dollar bequeathed will
be spent on human capital.  Since the reward for human capital investment exceeds the cost of
investment (foregone interest on financial investments), family resources are increased by this
investment.  Additional human investments are made until diminishing returns set in and the returns
on the two investments are equal.  
Figure 1, presented in Becker (1967), captures these ideas.  The constant-marginal-cost (horizontal)
supply of funds curve represents a situation in which parents can borrow unlimited amounts at the
market interest rate.  The demand curves represent marginal returns to human investment for twoEconomic Interpretations ￿ 3
2Here and in the remainder of the paper when we refer to ￿ability￿ we mean endowed ability as
opposed to acquired human capital.
children; the right-hand demand curve belongs to the higher-ability child.
2  Drawing the demand
curves this way, we assume child ability complements human capital ￿ the return on investments is
higher the higher is child ability.  (The positive correlation between child education and parent
earnings among wealthy ￿ presumably unconstrained ￿ families suggests this complementarity.)
Notice that in this framework parental income and wealth play no role in determining child education
or earnings ￿ only child ability matters.  
Combining this economic model of investment with a model of intergenerational ability transmission
produces a model of intergenerational mobility.  Since earnings are unaffected by family
characteristics other than child ability, intergenerational earnings mobility is determined by the
transmission of ability.  Clearly, the rate of earnings mobility is greater the smaller the association
between child and parent ability.  In addition, Han and Mulligan (2001) derive that earnings mobility
should be greater in societies with less variance in ability.  The greater is the variance in ability, the
more closely earnings reflect ability (holding variance in other factors constant).  With relatively less
influence of other factors, the correlation between generations increases.
While earnings is an often-cited measure of economic status, consumption may be more interesting
because it is more closely related to welfare.  In this model, human capital investments are chosen
to maximize family resources.  Given the resulting within-family distribution of earnings, parents
can transfer consumption between generations and among siblings using bequests.  Wealthy parents
may wish to bequeath assets to allow their child to consume beyond his/her wages; poor families
may need (or wish) to finance human investment with debt and so leave negative financial bequests.
Very able, high earning children may be left smaller bequests so that less able siblings can be
supported with larger gifts.
The implications of the model for consumption mobility are developed in Becker and Tomes (1986)
and Mulligan (1997).  The reader may recognize this permanent-income intergenerational model asEconomic Interpretations ￿ 4
3In this and all other predictions discussed in this paper, we consider the correlation between the
consumption of a parent and a representative child.  An alternative would be to measure
consumption earned by all members of a family in a given generation, or ￿dynastic
consumption.￿  Lange (2002) shows that the theory predicts dynastic consumption may regress
away from the mean￿a sign of extreme immobility￿even if individual consumption does regress
to the mean.
4If parental altruism and earnings are positively correlated, consumption regresses away from the
mean and the gap between rates of consumption mobility and earnings mobility is even larger. 
Greater mobility in earnings is to be expected even if there is a negative covariance between
parental earnings and altruism as long as this covariance is limited in magnitude.
5We owe this point to Gary Becker.  A few empirical studies of intergenerational labor supply
correlations (eg., Antel 1992 and Mulligan 1996) have looked at the analogous implication, with
some disagreement as to whether the evidence supports the theory.
a cousin to life cycle models of consumption and earnings.  And, like life cycle models, this model
predicts smoothing of consumption across periods.  If consumption is smoothed across generations,
then we expect less mobility in consumption than in earnings.
3  In fact, if parental altruism toward
children is uncorrelated with parental earnings, the model predicts that consumption does not regress
to the mean in percentage terms, an outcome often equated with complete immobility!
4  The analogy
to life cycle earnings models also produces additional theoretical predictions.  Because we expect
ability to be more correlated between periods of a person￿s life than between generations of a family,
we expect more intergenerational earnings mobility than life cycle earnings mobility.
5 
Model predictions for consumption and earnings mobility pertain to time series and not a single
cross-section.  For example, the model above suggests that consumption should grow, over many
generations, at the same rate for rich and poor dynasties.  But in any one particular generation,
aggregate economic shocks may create systematically different intergenerational consumption
growth for rich and poor families.  So, looking at data spanning only two generations, we may see
patterns in consumption and earnings mobility that are uncharacteristic for the economy over the
long run.  Suppose, for example, that the stock market and other assets disproportionately held by
richer dynasties earned abnormal returns in the 1980’s and 1990’s ￿ returns unanticipated by earlier
generations.  This would create higher intergenerational consumption growth for richer dynasties and
thereby less consumption mobility, but this situation would be temporary.  Perhaps moreEconomic Interpretations ￿ 5
importantly, to the extent that returns to human investments increased among high skilled workers
in this same period, earnings mobility would also be temporarily lower.  With this in mind, we must
be careful interpreting existing empirical estimates of mobility because most available data pertain
to only one or two generations ￿ typically born in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  Are we learning from low
mobility estimates that economic status is relatively immobile, or only that these one or two
generations were exposed to aggregate shocks that disproportionately favored richer families?
To this point, the discussion has assumed perfect credit markets and that households can borrow as
much as they desire, across generations if necessary.  If a family is credit constrained, they would
like to borrow against the child￿s future earnings to finance human investment, but they are unable
to do so.  Since the family is prohibited from borrowing, the child acquires less human capital and
so the return on such investment is higher than that on financial bequests.  Clearly, the parent in such
a family does not wish to bequeath assets; the child is better off if these funds are invested in human
capital.  In this setting, earnings persist across generations both because ability persists (as was
discussed before) and because credit constraints limit educational choice (see also Loury 1981).
Based on this analysis, economists point to three factors that should determine whether credit
constraints bind.  First, societies with well-functioning credit markets ￿ or good alternatives to credit
market financing of human investment ￿ should have fewer constrained families and experience
greater intergenerational earnings mobility.  Second, family income is also a factor since wealthy
parents are able to finance human investments out of their own wealth even when credit markets are
unavailable.  Finally, endowed ability of the child is relevant.  Because high-ability children warrant
greater human capital acquisition, families with high-ability children are more likely constrained than
families with low-ability children (holding parental earnings constant) if ability complements human
capital.  Figure 2 illustrates this outcome using computer-simulated data according to parameter
values set in Han and Mulligan (2001, Case 3, but excluding ￿market luck￿).  The top panel shows
parent and child log earnings in a world with perfect access to credit markets; the bottom panel
presents the same population without credit markets.  The line in the figure divides families which
are affected by the constraint (above the line) from those which are not (below the line).  Within a
group of families with equal parent earnings, human capital and earnings are limited for children ofEconomic Interpretations ￿ 6
6This method only ￿partially￿ evaluates the interpretation because it is also possible for all types
of nonlinearities to be found in the quantile regression either with or without credit constraints. 
The point is that a researcher who interprets a nonlinearity at the mean as evidence of credit
constraints also assumes linearity would have resulted in the absence of credit constraints.  The
quantile regressions can help assess whether this interpretation is consistent with the data.
highest ability ￿ those found at the top of the joint earnings distribution ￿ since these children require
the most human investment (and ultimately earn the most).
The study of earnings regression nonlinearities is a good example of the general theme that
intergenerational mobility is an aggregate of several economic behaviors.  Focusing on the role of
parent earnings, Becker and Tomes (1986 S14) present the seminal hypothesis: earnings are less
mobile among low-earning families.  However, recent studies have considered the joint implications
of credit-market quality, parental earnings, and child ability for intergenerational earnings
correlations.  Han and Mulligan (2001) suggest that the concave pattern predicted by Becker and
Tomes is mitigated by the fact that high-ability children tend to come from high-earning parents.
They report numerical simulations showing how a positive correlation between parental earnings and
child ability thwarts detection of differing rates of mobility with current data sets.  Corak and Heisz
(1999) further suggests that credit constraints will rarely bind at the bottom of the parental earnings
distribution if these children are typically less able and receive their desired education in public
schools.  Since high-earning parents can self-finance human investments, they too are unconstrained.
Thus Corak and Heisz speculate middle-earning families may be most susceptible to credit
constraints; earnings mobility then would be least prevalent among families in the middle of the
parent earnings distribution.  Grawe (2001b) generalizes this point, showing that almost any
monotonic child-parent earnings relation can be derived from the model either with or without
borrowing constraints.  Hence credit constraints need not imply concavity and concavity need not
evidence credit constraints.  Grawe demonstrates that researchers who wish to attribute to credit
constraints observed differences in earnings mobility between parent-earnings groups can partially
evaluate the credibility of this interpretation using quantile regressions.  Quantile regressions allow
researchers to see whether the observed change in mobility is found at the top or the bottom of the
joint distribution; Figure 2 shows that evidence of credit constraints will be found only at the top.
6Economic Interpretations ￿ 7
7Of course, some argue that cognitive test scores are themselves dependent on parental income. 
See Mayer (1997) for a discussion of recent and past work relating income to test scores.
Credit constraints also have implications for intergenerational correlations of consumption. Where
credit constraints limit the achievement of children relative to parents as measured by earnings, they
also mean that parents are less able to shift consumption in the child generation toward consumption
of the parent.  Thus, credit constraints produce intergenerational consumption mobility.  However,
if enough families have access to credit markets, consumption remains less mobile than earnings
across generations.  Further, groups exhibiting greater intergenerational earnings mobility may be
expected to have less intergenerational consumption mobility since mobility in earnings is a signal
of well-functioning credit markets.
Empirical Successes and Failures of Economic Models of Intergenerational Credit Constraints
Data clearly show that children from richer families enjoy more human investment and earnings.
But this observation may simply represent the covariance of child ability and parent income.  Indeed,
Cameron and Heckman (1998) find no relationship between parent income and child education,
controlling for cognitive ability.
7  In addition, Mulligan (1999) finds a strong positive correlation
between child￿s earnings and parental income after controlling for measures of human investment.
These findings suggest that persistence of ability causes intergenerational status correlations.  Using
the insights of Becker and Tomes, researchers have employed intergenerational correlations to test
for and measure distortions caused by credit market imperfections.
One way to investigate this issue is through analysis of cross-country evidence on whether countries
with greater public provision of human capital experience greater intergenerational mobility. For
example, educational subsidies are exceptionally high in Scandinavian countries, and
intergenerational effects of family income and family background appear to be weaker there than in
the United States (Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997;  Bjorklund et al., 2000).  Similarly, Grawe (2002)
finds that intergenerational mobility in Canada, which has large education subsidies,  is equal to or
greater than that in the United States. More broadly, Grawe suggests comparing mobility inEconomic Interpretations ￿ 8
developed countries, which as a group may spend relatively high amounts on educational subsidies,
to mobility in less developed countries, such as Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, and Peru. The results do
point toward less earnings mobility in these countries. 
These cross-country results have two interpretations based on the model presented above.  One
interpretation emphasizes credit constraints (as in the Becker-Tomes analysis) and sees differential
education subsidies as the source of different mobility rates across countries.  Another interpretation
emphasizes ability heterogeneity (as in the Han-Mulligan analysis), recognizing the exceptional
diversity found in the U.S., and in some developing countries.  Unfortunately, with data from only
a few countries, it is difficult to differentiate these hypotheses ￿ or to rule out alternative
explanations.
Credit constraints have also been studied using single-country data by comparing rates of mobility
across parent-earnings groups.  Early studies focused on the Becker-Tomes conjecture that earnings
mobility is greatest among high-earning families.  However, Berhman and Tuabman (1990) and
Solon (1992) find the opposite pattern in the U.S.  In Canada the conjecture is also rejected.  With
around 400,000 families, the data set used by Corak and Heisz (1999) is the largest intergenerational
data set in the literature and hence is the data set best suited for detecting differences in mobility
across earnings groups.  Corak and Heisz find that mobility is lowest among middle-earning families.
Other studies (see those reviewed by Cameron and Heckman 1999 or Carmeron and Taber 2000, and
Card 1999 for an opposing view) have looked for, and failed to find, differences in returns to
schooling across parental income groups.  
But this may not contradict the theory as much as remind us that parental income is a crude measure
of credit constraint susceptibility; child ability also matters.  Several studies attempt to disentangle
child ability from parent earnings.  Shea (2000) examines three factors that are presumed to be
uncorrelated with parent ability (union status, industry, and job loss), uses them as instruments for
father￿s income, and finds less income mobility among the poor.  Alternatively, Behrman and
Taubman (1990) look at the timing of earnings over the life cycle.  Father￿s ability is correlated with
the present value of his lifetime earnings, but even people of high ability may experience lean years,Economic Interpretations ￿ 9
8However, the authors acknowledge that the decision to measure fathers in the child￿s 15
th year
was made to minimize the estimated mobility.  In fact, the correlation between parent and child
earnings would have been reduced by one-third to one-half if either age 14 or age 16 had been
used.  An decrease in estimated earnings mobility of approximately one-third might yet be
attributable to credit market imperfections. 
9Using a sample created from Survey of Income and Program Participation data with fewer
observations and fewer years of observation, Mazumder finds a similar degree of income
mobility among the low net worth group and tremendous income mobility among the high net
especially at the beginning of a career which is often when child investments are made.  Behrman
and Taubman measure father￿s earnings at the time the child is a teenager and at another point
roughly a decade later.  They find less intergenerational earnings mobility when using the earlier
measure of father￿s income.
8  However, Behrman and Taubman￿s finding is anticipated not only by
the credit constraints theory, but also the life cycle theory of earnings, as Grawe (2001a) notes.  For
fathers as a group, inequality of log earnings grows with age.  If measured permanent income is a
scalar multiple of true permanent income and the scalar increases with age, then the estimated effect
of father￿s income on son￿s will naturally diminish with age.  This effect explains one-third of the
variation between reported elasticity estimates.  Finally, Grawe (2001b) uses the quantile regression
method described above to test the hypothesis that credit constraints cause the earnings mobility
patterns observed in Canada.  Contrary to the predicted effect of credit constraints, the data exhibit
greater mobility among sons found at the bottom of the joint distribution.  Given the Canadian
government￿s support of education, this finding may point us back to the institutional features that
differ across countries. 
The studies above explore variables that, in theory, determine the likelihood of a binding credit
constraint ￿ country, parental income, and child ability.  Another approach is to partition families
into two groups by their likelihood of being constrained.  Theory predicts that the group that is more
likely constrained will experience less intergenerational earnings mobility and more intergenerational
consumption mobility.  Using a sample created from Social Security earnings files, Mazumder
(2001) separates families by net worth.  He finds lower earnings mobility in families with low net
worth than in families with high net worth, although the standard errors are too large to reject
equality.
9  In contrast, Mulligan (1997) partitions families by bequest behavior: one ￿unconstrained￿Economic Interpretations ￿ 10
worth group; this result is statistically significant.  Gaviria (1998) also uses net worth to partition
families, in intergenerational samples drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and for
some of those samples finds more wage mobility in the high net worth group.
10The ￿child￿ respondents are asked their expectations concerning bequests at age 25-35.
11Interestingly, there is a different link between child￿s schooling and parental income among
those children receiving or expecting bequest; Tomes (1981) reports a similar finding in a study
of families whose bequests were including a probate sample.
12In our analysis, we also assume that lump sum taxes are employed by the government.  For a
model along these lines, see Becker and Murphy (1988).  Becker and Tomes (1979) and Mulligan
group for whom children received or expect to receive bequests of at least $25,000 (1989 dollars),
and another ￿possibly constrained￿ group with small or zero actual and anticipated bequests.
10
Consistently, less mobility is found in consumption than in earnings.  He also often reports that the
partition with more consumption mobility has less earnings mobility, although not always in the
direction predicted by the theory.
11  Finally, Mulligan (1999) partitions  families according to the
quality of public schooling in their state of residence, and often finds more consumption mobility
in groups with less earnings mobility.  We are not aware of a non-economic model predicting either
the observed gap between consumption and earnings mobility or that groups with more consumption
mobility have less earnings mobility.
Progressive Policy and Intergenerational Mobility
Perhaps one goal of government policy is to alter earnings and consumption mobility by changing
family investments.  In this section we examine two such policies ￿ public investment in human
capital and bequest taxes ￿ and show how the economic theory above guides us to deeper
understanding of sometimes counter-intuitive results.
In the United States, direct government investments in human capital are substantial.  Education
expenditures alone exceed $450 billion annually or more than $5,800 per person between the ages
of 5 and 24.  In addition, federal outlays on health exceed $350 billion per year.  To focus on the
theory of human capital investment, suppose the government finances these expenditures with
borrowing and repays the debt later with receipts from recipients of these investments.
12  Economic Interpretations ￿ 11
(1997) study the issue of non-lump-sum taxation as it relates to mobility.
13Note the assumption in the model that government and private human capital investments are
substitutes.  Goldberger (1989) points out that if government investments are modeled as
complementary investments that raise the return to private education expenditures, then this
offsetting behavior will not occur.  Becker and Tomes (1986) and Becker (1989) acknowledge
this possibility, but point out that the substitutable qualities of the two types of investments are
clear  while the complementary characteristics are not ￿ in fact, it may be that some government
investment programs reduce the return to private spending.  For instance, see Peltzman (1973). 
This motivates the decision to model government and private investments as substitutes.
In many cases, government investments are substitutes for private investments.  For example, both
private and public schools may teach a child to read, and when a child has learned to read at one
school, there is little return to time spent learning reading at the other school.  And so, reductions
in private investments may partially or completely offset government investments.  There are three
cases to consider.  First, if public investments fall short of the efficient level and no credit constraints
exist, then families simply invest the difference between the public investment and the efficient
level.  In this case, government investment crowds out private investment dollar-for-dollar and has
no net effect.
13  Clearly, there will be no effect on intergenerational mobility of either earnings or
consumption in this case.  The second case is identical to the first except that credit constraints exist.
While we still expect some reduction in private investments (as parents use part of the government
aid to indirectly increase their own consumption), the government investment serves as a partial
substitute for credit market access and so child education and earnings will increase. Thus,
government education spending should reduce the education and earnings gap between children of
rich and poor families, decrease the intergenerational education and earnings correlations, but
decrease intergenerational consumption mobility.  In the third case, government investment in human
capital exceeds the efficient level.  In this case, total human capital increases.  As a result,
intergenerational earnings mobility increases while consumption mobility is unaffected.  Hence, an
observation that countries with larger public human capital expenditures have more earnings
mobility is not evidence of credit constraints, unless those countries also have less consumption
mobility.Economic Interpretations ￿ 12
A wide range of empirical evidence documents partial offsetting in private investment decisions.
At a basic level, public high schools have not increased total educational attainment by 12 years.
Disturbingly, Peltzman (1973) finds that by providing dramatically cheaper and lower-quality
colleges and universities, public education funding has in some cases actually resulted in decreased
total educational expenditures.  In addition, crowding out is documented in public health by
Scrimshaw (1978), in prenatal care by Jacobson (1980), and in the School Lunch Program by Long
(1991).  Crowding out is also consistent with the finding that school quality differences do not alter
the rate of either consumption or earnings mobility in cross-section (Mulligan 1999, although Cooper
1996 reports a dramatic effect on earnings mobility).  
While the aggregate picture points to offsetting investments, there is evidence that programs targeted
to low-income families, like early childhood education, have been successful in raising levels of
human capital (see Barnett 1992 and Heckman 1999).  Perhaps the predicted relationship between
school funding and intergenerational mobility is found in the long run, because the intergenerational
education correlation diminished following increased government education expenditures at the
beginning of the 20
th century (Featherman and Hauser 1976), although less is known about secular
trends in the degree of consumption or earnings mobility.
Regulation of financial investments have also been used to reduce intergenerational status
correlations.  We focus here on the bequest tax.  While few families face the inheritance tax in the
United States, other countries, like France and Sweden, apply inheritance taxes to a wider
population.  Such taxes reduce the incentive to give bequests to children.  However, economic theory
suggests that the effect on intergenerational mobility depends on which measure of economic
status￿earnings or consumption￿is used, and how a policy changes the marginal tax rate structure.
If bequests are taxed at a flat rate, then a simple model like that of Becker and Tomes implies that
families face a lower incentive to invest in financial assets (and a lower opportunity cost to invest
in human capital).  But as Mulligan (1997) points out, the resulting model is identical to the original
model of Becker and Tomes except that the gross rate of return to financial assets is reduced by the
level of the tax.  While families will individually alter their behavior, there is no effect on theEconomic Interpretations ￿ 13
analysis of intergenerational earnings and consumption mobility: earnings mobility results from
transmission in ability while consumption does not regress to the mean. 
Graduated rate bequest taxes do affect earnings and consumption mobility. Suppose the tax has two
marginal tax rates ￿ 0 percent is paid on small bequests and some higher marginal rate is paid on
large estates.  Under this policy, high-earning parents are more likely to face a high bequest tax rate
than low-earning parents.  The higher the tax rate, the lower the return to financial investments and
so the greater the investment in human capital.  This results in less intergenerational earnings
mobility because high-earning parents are given a larger incentive to invest in education.  The impact
of a progressive bequest tax on consumption mobility can be broken into three parts.  Low-
consumption families are unaffected since they are not taxed.  Families wealthy enough to bequeath
large estates will experience lower dynastic consumption growth than in a no-tax world.  However,
the predictions concerning consumption mobility are exactly like those of the previous flat-tax
analysis.  Finally, those families who bequeath exactly the amount at which the progressive tax rate
kicks in, on the margin, will use human capital investments to transfer consumption to their children
since the tax raises the cost of bequests.  As a result, they experience a higher degree of consumption
mobility.  Across the entire population, the policy increases intergenerational consumption mobility
￿ a pattern opposite that predicted for earnings mobility.
A Concluding Defense of Economic Theory
As any economics student can attest, economic theory is costly to master.  If economic theories of
intergenerational correlations fail to produce verifiable predictions, those who propose we proceed
without theory have a strong case.  For the sake of brevity, this paper focuses on the insights theory
generates in understanding credit market failure and intergenerational correlations.  This is not meant
to detract from other successful theoretical contributions which we incompletely note here.
For instance, the economic theory of fertility (see Becker and Lewis 1973) represents an important
departure from many biological approaches, featuring a budget constraint in which number of
children interacts with the quality of each child.  From this, a negative relationship between familyEconomic Interpretations ￿ 14
size and child achievement is derived ￿ a relationship found in some empirical work (however,
Kessler 1991 and others question the origin of the correlation citing multicollinearity in number of
siblings and birth order).  Neighborhood effects suggested in models of locally controlled schools
(Benabou 1993; 1996) are found among immigrant groups (Borjas 1992).  The similarity of the
earnings of sons and sons-in-law, predicted by matching models of marriage (Becker 1973), is
confirmed by Atkinson et al. (1983) and Lam and Schoeni (1993;1994).  Mulligan (1997, p. 339)
extends this result, pointing out that matching models imply that intergenerational mobility should
be similar for sons and daughters, a result found in U.S. data.  And the economic theory of
discrimination has been fruitfully applied to intergenerational correlations by Smith and Welch
(1986) and Card and Lemieux (1994) among others.S
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